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ABSTRACT
Occupational safety continues to be a major social concern in 
spite of the attention which it has received over the years. While 
unsafe acts and behaviors have been major contributors to accidents, 
the attention paid to increasing safety by changing human behavior 
has only been sporadic. This study used an applied behavior analysis 
package of training, goal setting, and feedback as a behavioral 
approach to improving safety in an industrial setting. In addition, 
the effects of changing the frequency of feedback on safe behavior 
performance were investigated.
All the employees in a plant engaged in the manufacture and 
repair of heat exchangers, were put through various phases of the 
above mentioned applied behavior analysis package. Safe behavior 
performance of the employees was monitored over the ten month 
duration of the study through behavioral observation and measurement. 
A variation and extension of the basic reversal (A-B-A) design was 
used to assess the effect of varying the frequency of feedback along 
with the other interventions, namely, training and goal setting. 
Statistical analyses were performed through the autoregressive inte­
grated moving average (ARIMA) analysis suitable for such time series 
data, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and comparison of means through 
Duncan's multiple range test and Tukey's method for pairwise 
comparison of means.
Based on the results obtained, the following conclusions were 
arrived at:
vii
It is possible to improve performance through a combination
of training, goal setting, and feedback as a package of
applied behavior analysis.
Providing feedback can help improve performance over and 
above the level achieved with only training and goal setting. 
It may not be necessary for feedback to be as frequent as 
possible to sustain a given, desired level of performance. 
It is possible to sustain a desired level of performance with 
some optimum feedback frequency which may be less than the 
most frequent possible.
A behavioral approach to safety can complement a
conventional, environmental approach in sustaining and
enhancing the safety level in an organization.
viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the attention which it has received over the 
years, occupational safety continues to be a major area of social 
concern. This should be evident from the fact that there were 12,300 
deaths and 2,100,000 disabling injuries in work related accidents in 
the United States in 1981 at the cost $32.5 billion (National Safety 
Council, 1982). The figures in terms of rates, perhaps, appear more 
alarming. There was a work related death every 42 minutes and a work 
related injury every 15 seconds (National Safety Council, 1982).
Attempts to reduce accidents and the consequent loss of and 
damage to human life and limb, and property have taken various forms 
from government legislation, private safety related organizations, to 
company-sponsored safety programs. While a majority of earlier 
efforts attempted to reduce accidents by eliminating or reducing 
hazards of the work environment (Peterson, 1978), later and more 
recent efforts have also looked at the human side of accident 
prevention (Fitch, Herman, and Hopkins, 1976). This is based on 
early estimates that as many as 88 percent of all work related 
accidents can be attributed to unsafe acts (Heinrich, 1959). Most of 
the earlier efforts in safety research were anecdotal and descriptive 
in nature, lacking rigorous research documentation (Chelius, 
1974; Ellis, 1975). It was this combination of increased focus on the
human aspect and the need for more rigorous research which evolved in 
the use of applied behavior analysis in occupational safety. It is 
expected that applied behavior analysis with its concentration on 
observation, analysis, and measurement of behavior and its change, 
can make a sizable contribution towards occupational safety through 
its human behavior component. In keeping with this, a recent study 
by the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Division of the 
American Psychological Association identified "concerns for safety 
and conservation" to be one of the "Research Needs from the 'Real' 
World" and listed "How can individual safe behavior be promoted?" as 
one of the important and worthwhile questions to be studied 
(Campbell, Daft, and Hulin, 1982).
Any attempt at dealing with human behavior in organizations 
inevitably involves issues of motivation. Among the various theories 
and techniques of motivation, goal setting and feedback have been 
shown to have fairly widespread applicability in laboratory as well 
as in field settings (Locke et al., 1981). It was due to these 
reasons that goal setting and feedback were used in combination with 
applied behavior analysis in this field application to occupational 
safety. While some existing studies have attempted to apply a some­
what similar program to industrial organizations, most of these 
organizations did not have well established and formalized safety 
programs. In contrast, this study was conducted in an organization 
which already had a fairly comprehensive and well established safety 
program.
3The practical contribution of the study, thus, was to assess 
whether a behaviorally based safety program can complement an 
on-going, conventional safety program. On the theoretical level, the 
study investigated the effects of varying the frequency of feedback 
on performance (outcome) in a field setting. This is an issue which 
had hardly been investigated, particularly in field settings.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
SAFETY
Historically, particularly in the evolution of society from 
savagery to civilization through the growth of families, communities, 
tribes, etc., safety appeared to have been guided by the basic idea 
of "the greatest good of the greatest number" (Grimaldi and Simonds, 
1975). It was this way of thinking which resulted in individual 
injuries being regarded as personal issues to be settled through com­
pensating or indemnifying the injured by those who either caused the 
injury or were considered responsible for it. It is this principle 
of redressal through compensation which is perhaps the first recorded 
reference to accidental injuries in the Code of Hammurabi around 2000 
B.C. There is, however, hardly any information about safety in work 
situations during the ancient civilizations and up to the 15th 
century. The first major development after that was a series of 
statutes in England governing working conditions through the 18th 
century. Most of these "statutes of labourers," as they came to be 
called, also seemed to be designed more for the benefit of the com­
munity under the "greatest good for the greatest number" idea and not 
for the protection of the workers. Perhaps the first governmental 
action for safety resulted from a serious outbreak of fever in the 
cotton mills in Manchester in 1784. The Manchester Board of Health
5was formed in 1795 and in 1802, the Health and Morals of Apprentices 
Act was passed which effectively, was the first step toward govern­
ment regulated prevention of injuries in English factories. 
Beginning with the Mines Act of 1842 which provided for punitive com­
pensation for preventable injuries caused by unguarded machinery and 
the governmental mine safety inspection program in 1850, a number of 
laws and regulations were passed covering almost all types of 
factories. In the United States, Massachusetts was the first state 
to follow English legislation in 1876, and in 1877 the Commonwealth 
passed factory acts covering most of the English laws. While it is 
reasonable to expect that all this legislation must have had some 
effect on work injuries, the overall effect was far from adequate and 
this gave rise to workmen's compensation laws, first in Germany in 
1885 and then in Great Britain in 1897. Maryland was the first state 
in the U.S. to pass a workmen's compensation law which was so 
restrictive as to have almost no practical value. New York state 
passed one in 1908 which was ruled unconstitutional. Then in 1911, 
Wisconsin passed a similar law which was held to be constitutional. 
Another six states followed in 1911 itself and by 1947, all states 
had similar laws in effect.
The workmen's compensation concept of requiring the employer 
to compensate the injured employee irrespective of negligence, made 
employers realize that preventing accidents from happening might be 
financially sounder than paying compensation for them. This, coupled 
with workmen's compensation or casualty insurance carriers’ use 
of "schedule rating" plan under which factories with lower rates of
6accidents are charged lower/reduced premiums for similar coverage; 
possibly started the organized safety movement. In a way, the 
workmen's compensation legislation made industrial safety, a 
financially viable proposition (Peterson, 1978).
After a number of industries and occupations had been covered 
under specific legislation, it was in 1970 that the Williams-Steiger 
Act was passed by the U.S. Congress. Commonly known as the Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Act (OSHA), it has been termed as "the most 
pervasive safety law ever passed" and came into effect on August 28, 
1971. OSHA authorizes the U.S. federal government to set and enforce 
standards for safety and health for all places of employment 
affecting inter-state commerce. It also provides for civil and 
criminal penalties for violation of standards. For implementing and 
enforcing the law, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(also known as OSHA) was created in the Department of Labor. Simul­
taneously another new agency, the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) was authorized to conduct research, experiments, and 
demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health; to develop 
OSHA criteria; to publish data on occupational illness; and to 
conduct necessary inspections (Grimaldi & Simonds, 1975).
Parallel to the legislation and government agencies, a number 
of private organizations have been concerned with and involved in 
safety. The steel industry appears to be the pioneer in this regard. 
Among the first were the Illinois Steel Company which set up a safety 
department at its Joliet Works around 1892, and the United States
Steel Corporation who set up a committee for safety inspections and 
accident prevention in 1906. Perhaps the most important private 
safety organization today, the National Safety Council (NSC), 
formally set up in 1915, grew out of a 1912 meeting of the Associa­
tion of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers. The NSC, probably the 
world's premier safety organization, has a membership of many 
thousands of industrial and business firms, as well as schools and 
other public organizations. It also has an outstanding library 
related to safety. Just a few of the other private organizations are 
the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Com­
missions (1914), the Center for Safety at New York University (1938, 
earlier known as the Center for Safety Education), American Society 
of Safety Engineers (1947), the Professional Division on Safety of 
the Society (1952) in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. 
There are many other private organizations, particularly insurance 
companies (e.g. the American Insurance Association) and industrial 
organizations which have contributed to the development of safety 
ideals and methodology (Grimaldi & Simonds, 1975).
As a result of the above mentioned efforts and organizations, 
there has been substantial improvements. An estimated 18,000 to 
21,000 workers lost their lives in 1912 in accidental deaths. In 
1981, in a work force more than double in size than 1912 and 
producing more than nine times as much, there were 12,300 work 
deaths. The rate of accidental work deaths per 100,000 popula­
tion has been reduced 76 percent from 1912 to 1981 (National 
Safety Council, 1982). However, inspite of these improvements, the
need and importance of occupational safety are highlighted by the 
following:
a. There were approximately 2,100,000 disabling work 
injuries in the United States in 1981, out of which 
12,300 were fatal and 70,000 resulted in some permanent 
impairment.
b. The time lost due to work injuries in 1981 was estimated 
to be 80,000,000 days.
c. The total cost of work accidents in 1981 was $32.5 
billion. (National Safety Council, 1982.)
It is, thus, evident from the above that elimination of or any 
reduction in accidents and injuries at work will not only alleviate 
human misery and tragedy but will also benefit society in more
concrete terms like increased productivity and financial savings.
Human Aspect of Safety
Early safety efforts, particularly before 1931, tended to
concentrate almost entirely on making the working conditions and 
environment safe and hazard-free through good housekeeping, putting 
guards over and around moving parts, and other similar actions 
(Peterson, 1982; Ellis, 1975; Fitch, Herman, and Hopkins, 1976; 
Grimaldi and Simonds, 1975). In a way, even OSHA has been considered 
to be the culmination of such work environment approach to safety
(Ellis, 1975; Peterson, 1982). The publication of Heinrich's 
Industrial Accident Prevention in 1931, with the "domino" model of 
accident causation, perhaps, was the first time that the human aspect
9was formally brought into safety. The second of Heinrich's ten 
axioms of safety was that "the unsafe acts of persons are responsible 
for a majority of accidents." While Heinrich's view was that 88 
percent of accidents are attributable to unsafe acts, the current 
estimates put the figure somwhere between 75 to 95 percent (Deak, 
1982).
Following the recognition of the human element in safety, an 
interactive view of accident causation developed, maintaining that it 
was the interaction between workers and their physical environments 
which primarily resulted in accidents (Fitch et al., 1976; Grimaldi 
and Simonds, 1975; Hale and Hale, 1970; Santamaria, 1970). This 
interactionist view led to approaches like human factor engineering 
which consists of "designing a system so that machines, human tasks, 
and the environment are compatible with the capabilities and limita­
tions of people to minimize error" (National Safety Council, 1974, 
p. 221). While a combination of different approaches like "engineer­
ing," "human," etc. has been recommended (Ellis, 1975; Kerr, 1957), 
need for a more effective approach to the "behavioral half of the 
safety equation" has also been stressed (Fitch et al., 1976).
Earlier Human Aspect Research
The earlier research on the human aspect of safety has, in 
the main, concentrated in three broad areas: identification of
individual employee traits under the "accident proneness" theory; 
effectiveness of informational or communication safety campaigns on 
employees; and comparing organizations with different accident rates.
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The earliest work on the concept of accident proneness was 
done by the Industrial Fatigue (later Health) Board in England around 
1920 and the term "accident proneness" was first used by Farmers and 
Chambers in 1939 (Hale and Hale, 1970; Schugsta, 1973). While the 
concept gained early popularity and quite a few supportive studies 
were reported; researchers also started raising questions and doubts 
about the concept quite early (Mintz and Blum, 1949). Various 
studies of individual personality traits have been reported which 
refute the view that accident proneness is a stable personality trait 
(Crawford, 1960; Davids and Mahoney, 1957; Harris, 1950; Hale and 
Hale, 1970; Kerr, 1957; Mintz and Blum, 1949). A survey of 35,000 
injury causing accidents (27,000 industrial and 8,000 non-industrial) 
revealed that accident repeaters (who had more than one accident of 
the same type) were involved in only 0.5 percent of the cases whereas 
75 percent of the cases were due to "relatively infrequent solitary 
experiences" of a significantly large group of persons (86 percent) 
(Schulzinger, 1954). The practicality of using the accident-prone­
ness concept for reducing accidents remains, at best, questionable 
(Peterson, 1982; Michaud, 1983).
While information and communication safety campaigns have 
been one of the most commonly used techniques of increasing safety 
consciousness and hoping for a consequent reduction in accidents, 
reviews indicate relatively little research on judging their effec­
tiveness (Haskins, 1969, 1970; Laner and Sell, 1960). General con­
clusions, based on the available studies, are that such campaigns can 
be effective based on a situational approach and the message being
11
considered relevant by the target population. Another interesting 
conclusion is that posters are least effective in situations where 
the incidence of unsafe activities is either very high or very low 
(Laner and Sell, 1960).
Studies of organizations have either been comparative between 
high and low accident rate companies (Cohen, Smith, and Cohen, 1975; 
Ellis, 1975; Safai-Sahrai, 1973) or across-the-board, cross-sectional 
studies (Kerr, 1950; Slivnick, Kerr, and Kosinar, 1957). Some of the 
studies have attempted to study a large number of variables in 
various companies (75 variables in 147 factories in the Slivnick et 
al., 1957 study for example). Difference among companies and 
correlations with accident rates have been found with a variety of 
variables including, among others, top management commitment to 
safety, formal company sponsored safety programs, employee involve­
ment in safety programs, disciplinary actions related to safety, 
existence of unions, labor-management relations, personnel policy, 
working conditions, garnisheed wages, and a host of other psycho­
social variables.
While the above mentioned research has made a valuable con­
tribution in furthering the work on safety, there are some 
limitations to the conclusions which can be drawn. A lot of the 
studies have been descriptive without any specific attempts at 
establishing cause-effect relationships and well controlled studies 
particularly in actual field settings have been very few, indeed 
(Ellis, 1975; Fitch et al., 1976; Haskins, 1969, 1970; Komaki,
Barwick, and Scott, 1978) though some well controlled studies in
12
simulated work situations have been reported (McKelvey, Engen, and
Peck, 1973; Rubinsky and Smith, 1973). Some of the studies have been
correlational which have familiar limitations like the inability to
infer causation from correlation (association), correlations being
either statistically insignificant or being too low to account for
sufficient variation, etc. (Fitch et al., 1976). In addition, these
studies have also included some variables which were beyond the
managements' control. Such variables, while helping to explain the
phenomena under consideration (accident rates), are hardly of any
help by way of application for controlling and/or reducing accidents
(Fitch et al., 1976). A review of the occupational safety research
literature concluded that
the quality and intensity of research necessary to draw firm
conclusions ---- were found to be remarkably inadequate ....
Unless much better evaluative research begins to be under­
taken, all of the innovative work safety programs in the 
future may well result in a waste of time and money (Ellis,
1975, pp. 180, 187).
A similar view was expressed by Chelius (1974) after reviewing the
empirical evidence concerning accident prevention:
We are at a point in our understanding of industrial safety 
where further anecodotes and even theoretical developments 
are of limited value. What is needed is empirical work ....
Only by such (empirical) analyses can we hope to develop 
programs which are based on more than just good intentions 
(p. 717).
The need for rigorous, well controlled, empirical, field 
studies in the area of occupational safety, and dealing with the 
human aspect in particular, is, thus, evident. Applied behavior 
analysis is an approach which seems eminently suitable for this 
purpose.
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APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
The roots of applied behavior analysis can be traced to the
early works of Watson (1913) and Thorndike (1913). The credit for
making the behaviorist approach practically applicable to real life
situation, however, goes to Skinner (1953, 1969). While the early
applications of the principles of operant conditioning and
reinforcement were in hospitals and schools with mentally ill
patients and young children, these were gradually applied to adult
working behavior in complex organizations (Nord, 1969; Jablonsky and
DeVries, 1972; Luthans and Kreitner, 1975; Schneier, 1975). With its
focus on observation, analysis, and measurement of behavior and its
change, applied behavior analysis has been described as "the
collection of research methods and strategies used to evaluate
scientifically the effects of any management program or procedure on
any socially important behavior" (Fitch et al., 1976, p. 619). In
more basic terms, it is
the process of applying sometimes tentative principles of 
behavior to the improvement of specific behaviors, and simul­
taneously evaluating whether or not any changes noted are 
indeed attributable to the process of application... In 
short, (it) is a self-examining, self-evaluating, discovery- 
oriented research procedure for studying behavior (Baer,
Wolf, and Risely, 1968, p. 91).
Behavior modification has been successfully used to modify a
variety of precisely defined target behaviors in organizational
settings. While Emery Air Freight is perhaps the most publicized
example of such an organizational application (Feeny, 1972; At Emery
Air Freight, 1973), some of the areas to which it has been applied
are absenteeism and attendence (Pedalino and Gamboa, 1974; Nord,
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1970, Wallin and Johnson, 1976; Kempen and Hall, 1977), punctuality 
(Hermann, de Montes, Dominguez, Montes, and Hopkins, 1973), produc­
tivity (Yukl, Wexley, and Seymore, 1972; Yukl and Latham, 1975), 
quality of output (Adam and Scott, 1971; Adam, 1972, 1975),
individual employee performance (Komaki, Waddell, and Pearce, 1977), 
energy and fuel oil consumption (Seaver and Patterson, 1976; Hayes 
and Cone, 1977; Seligman and Darley, 1977).
Following the success of applied behavior analysis in a 
variety of areas of human performance in industrial-organizational 
settings and the importance of the human element in occupational/ 
industrial safety, the use of applied behavior analysis in safety has 
been suggested for increasing the frequency of safe behaviors and 
decreasing the frequency of unsafe behaviors (Bird and Schlesinger, 
1970; Goldstein, 1975; Mclntire and White, 1975; Tuttle, Dachler, and 
Scheider, 1975; Fitch et al., 1976; Smith, Anger, and Uslan, 1978), 
Peterson, 1982).
Applied Behavior Analysis in Safety
Given the high contribution of human acts or behaviors to 
occupational injuries and accidents; it seems intuitive as well as 
logical that modifying human behavior from unsafe to safe through 
observation, analysis, and measurement should result in better 
safety. However, it has also been recognized that behavior modifica­
tion principles are almost always operating although the participants 
may not be aware of this (Hamner and Hamner, 1976; Gray, 1979). In
15
discussing various aspects of a worker’s decision to engage in unsafe
acts, Peterson (1982) observes that
one of the reasons people commit unsafe acts (undesired 
performance) is because they have been rewarded in the past 
for doing just that, and/or they have been ignored or 
penalized in the past for working safely. If management has 
ignored (or penalized) workers for safe behavior, or rewarded 
(in the workers' eyes) unsafe behavior, management has made 
unsafe behavior a logical choice for workers (p. 110).
Applied behavior analysis, by identifying and stressing the positive
and safe behaviors, avoids this inadvertent reinforcement of
undesired (unsafe) behaviors.
Another reason for workers indulging in unsafe behaviors is 
the low perceived probability of an unsafe act resulting in an 
accident and an accident resulting in an injury (Peterson, 1982). 
This is in keeping with Heinrich's (1959) estimate that on an 
average, 300 out of 330 unsafe acts do not result in an accident or 
an injury. Of the 30 that do result in accidents, 29 will cause only 
minor injuries and only 1 out of 330 will cause a major injury. 
Heinrich determined this "300-29-1 Ratio" based on a study of over 
5000 cases and also said that this was a conservative estimate. 
While the study may not have been methodologically very sound, it 
does give an indication of why everytime a person engages in an 
unsafe act and comes to no harm or grief, he/she is encouraged to do 
so again. Of course, the ratio would vary depending on the nature of 
work and various other considerations in a particular job. Unsafe 
acts being the basic cause, their elimination/reduction provides one 
of the biggest "preventive opportunity" in safey (Heinrich, 1959).
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Methodological Advantages in Safety 
Measurement and Evaluation
Other major advantages of using applied behavior analysis in
safety are in the areas of measurement and evaluation. Measurement
of safety has been a critical issue in the field of safety for quite
sometime. The National Safety Council has sponsored a special
Industrial Safety Performance Measurement Symposium and the Journal
of Safety Research has published a special issue on the subject.
"How to measure safety?" and whether the measures used are reliable
and useful; are questions frequently asked among researchers in
safety (Rockwell, 1959; Grimaldi, 1970; Jacobs, 1970; Komaki, et.
al., 1970; Tarrants, 1970). The lack of general agreement on
reliable measures has to some extent, prevented the field from
developing along the right lines as
the degree to which accident control is possible is a 
function of the adequacy of the measures used to identify 
the type and magnitude of potential injury-producing problems 
existing within our field of concern (Tarrants, 1970,
p. 106).
The currently used measures (based on ANSI and OSHA standards) rely 
primarily on actual incidence of injuries, whether disabling (lost­
time accidents) or medical treatment injuries or first aid cases. 
There are two major problems with such measures. One is that lost 
time accidents involving disabling injuries comprising deaths, 
permanent total disabilities, permanent partial disabilities, and 
temporary total disabilities, are what are called "rare events" 
because of the elements of chance and probability involved (Jacobs, 
1970). Infrequent and unpredictable occurrence makes them unsuitable
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as the primary indices of judging the efficacy of a safety program 
(Komaki et al., 1978). Even the less severe medical treatment 
injuries and first aid cases, although they do occur more frequently, 
are not reliable measures of safety due to large scale inaccuracies 
in reporting and recording, and shifting perceptions about the 
severity of injuries (Komaki et al., 1978, Tarrants, 1970).
The other problem with such measures is that all these are 
after-the-fact appraisals which record the consequences rather than 
measuring or helping in preventing the problem itself. The tradi­
tional approaches, for the most part, focus on "measuring the lack of 
safety instead of the presence of safety" (Tarrants, 1970, p. 107). 
Such measures contribute little toward suggesting measures and 
actions to prevent recurrence (Komaki et al., 1978) and any learning 
which takes place as a result of actual accidents and injuries ends 
up being very expensive (Kerr, 1957) in terms of physical and 
psychological damage.
To overcome such problems, it has been suggested that such 
measurement systems should be devised which can identify contributing 
factors, indicate positive steps that can be taken by both management 
and workers, identify loss-potential problems at the no-loss stage; 
and which can help predict, control, and reduce accident losses 
(Tarrants, 1970; Komaki et al., 1982). A measure based on safe 
and/or unsafe behavior frequency arrived at by direct observation and 
recording of specifically identified behaviors has been recommended 
as a sensitive and reliable measure of the safety performance of an 
organization (Jacobs, 1970; Fitch et al., 1976; Komaki et al., 1978).
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Once again, the focus of applied behavior analysis on observation and 
measurement of specific behaviors of interest provides not only an 
appropriate measure of the safety level in an organization but also 
helps in (a) assessing whether a program is having its desired effect 
or if there is need to change the interventions, and (b) clarifying 
and reinforcing the desired, safe behaviors (Komaki et al., 1978). 
The successful use of such a behaviorally specific observation 
measure in safety has been reported in empirical studies in the 
laboratory (McKelvey, Engen, and Peck, 1973; Rubinsky and Smith,
1973) as well as in some of the recent field studies (Smith, Anger, 
and Uslan, 1978; Rhoton, 1980, Zohar, 1980; Zohar, Cohen, and Azar, 
1980; Larson, Schnelle, Kirchner, Carr, Domash, and Risely, 1980; 
Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson, 1980; Komaki, 
Collins, and Penn, 1982; Reber, 1982).
The other methodological advantage in using applied behavior 
analysis in safety is for a reliable evaluation of the efficacy of a 
safety program through the use of within-subject experimental designs 
of the multiple-baseline and reversal types (Baer, Wolf, and Risely, 
1968; Kazdin, 1973; Bouchard, 1976; Fitch et al., 1976; Hersen and 
Barlow, 1976; Komaki, 1977). The use of such designs is especially 
useful for field studies where the use of control groups and randomi­
zation of subjects may either not be possible or be extremely 
difficult (Komaki, 1977).
The multiple-baseline design consists of two basic 
components: concurrent baselines and staggered interventions.
Data are collected over a period of time for concurrent baselines,
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interventions are staggered in time, and performance levels are 
compared between different phases to see whether effects are 
replicated at different times. If performance changes during or 
after and not prior to the intervention— at staggered times for 
various baselines--and changes each time the treatment/intervention 
is introduced or withdrawn, it can be concluded that the treatment/ 
intervention is responsible for the change. The design can be 
applied across individuals, groups, behaviors, or settings so long as 
it is possible to apply the intervention/treatment to one of these at 
a time without affecting the others (Hersen and Barlow, 1976; Komaki, 
1977).
The simplest form of reversal design (A-B-A) includes at 
least three phases: baseline (A), intervention (B), and reversal
(A); and data are collected repeatedly during each phase. If 
performance improves following the intervention and deteriorates 
during the reversal phase, "one can conclude with a high degree of 
certainty that the treatment variable (intervention) is the agent 
responsible for observed changes in the target behavior" (Hersen and 
Barlow, 1976, p. 176). A common extension of the A-B-A design 
includes a reintroduction of the intervention at the end resulting in 
an A-B-A-B type of design. This design has the advantage of ending 
with the intervention phase which can, then, be continued and the 
reintroduction of the intervention phase "strengthens the conclusions 
that can be derived as to its controlling effects over target 
behaviors under observation" (Hersen and Barlow, 1976, p. 181). In 
addition to drawing quite reliable conclusions about the efficacy of
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the interventions, such designs also help in ruling out alternative
plausible explanations for the change in behavior like history,
maturation, instrumentation, statistical regression, etc. (Campbell
and Stanley, 1966; Hersen and Barlow, 1976; Komaki, 1977). A number
of extensions and variations of the above basic designs have been
suggested, each with advantages in specific situations (Hersen and
Barlow, 1976). Assessment of the agreement of the observations made
by independent observers guards against observer bias by establishing
inter-rater reliability (Komaki, 1977). While such reversal designs
are occasionally referred to as single-case or single-subject
designs, they are not really restricted to only one or a small group
of individuals. Their use has been recommended from small businesses
with only one employee to plant operations with thousands of
employees (Komaki, 1977). Hersen and Barlow (1976) have noted the
superiority of the reversal designs by observing that
the multiple baseline design is considerably weaker than the 
withdrawal design as the controlling effects of the treatment 
on each of the target behaviors is not directly demonstrated 
(e.g., as in the A-B-A design). As noted earlier, the 
effects of the treatment variable are inferred from the 
untreated behaviors (p. 227).
This type of reversal designs have already been used in some recent
studies in the safety area (Rhoton, 1980; Zohar, 1980; Zohar, Cohen,
and Azar, 1980; Haynes, Pine, and Fitch, 1982).
The above review of the literature establishes applied 
behavior analysis with a behaviorally specific observational measure 
and a reversal design, to be eminently suitable for use in an 
industrial/occupational safety situation.
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GOAL SETTING AND FEEDBACK 
Goal Setting
Goal setting, since its formal presentation by Locke (1968), 
has emerged to be one of the major theories of motivation among the 
theories of behavioral choice as against theories of arousal 
(Mitchell, 1982; Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). It has also been 
noted to be "one of the most frequently tested theories in the field 
of organizational behavior (with) the recent research (being) both 
large in number and frequent in its support" (Mitchell, 1979, 
p. 258). Of course, Locke (1978), based on the "general recognition 
that rational human action is goal directed," has even maintained 
that most of the other major theories of motivation include goals in 
their formulations whether explicitly or implicitly.
Building on the earlier works of Dulany (1962, 1968), Mace 
(1935), Rand (1964), Ryan (1958), etc., and based on a series of 
laboratory experiments, Locke (1968) in what he called a "Theory of 
Task Motivation and Incentives," maintained that an individual's 
actions and behavior are regulated by his/her conscious ideas, 
intentions, goals, tasks. A goal is simply "what the individual is 
consciously trying to do" (Locke, 1968, p. 159); it is the object or 
aim of an action (Locke et al., 1980). Some other contentions of the 
theory are that hard goals result in a higher level of performance or 
output than easy goals; that specific hard goals result in a higher 
level of performance than no goals or a generalized goal of "do your 
best;" and that behavioral intentions regulate choice behavior. The
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theory also states that a person's goals also mediate how performance 
or output is affected by monetary incentives, time limits, per­
formance feedback (knowledge of results-KR), participation in 
decision making, and competition. Goals which are assigned to an 
individual (instructions given by a supervisor, for example) would 
have an effect on behavior and, thus, performance only to the degree 
that they are consciously accepted by the individual. As stated by 
Locke (1968),
it is not enough to know that an order or request was made; 
one has to know whether or not the individual heard it and 
understood it, how he appraised it, and what he decided to do 
about it before its effects on his behavior can be predicted 
and explained (p. 174).
While evidence from a number of laboratory experiments was 
cited in support of the theory (Locke, 1968), only four field studies 
were discussed. This led to some skepticism about the applicability 
of specific hard goals to increase the performance of employees in 
real organizational settings, where experimental "demand effects" are 
absent and acceptance of goals cannot be obtained so easily 
(Campbell, Dunnett, Lawler, and Weick, 1970; Dobmeyer, 1971). How­
ever, subsequent reviews have reported the beneficial effect of goal 
setting on task performance to be a fairly robust and replicable 
finding in the literature (Miner and Dachler, 1973, Steers and 
Porter, 1974; Latham and Yukl, 1975; Locke, 1975, Mitchell, 1979; 
Locke et al., 1981). Even support from field studies has not been 
lacking. Latham and Yukl (1975), for example, concluded after a 
review of 27 reports of field research that there was "strong support 
for (the) propositions that specific goals increase performance and
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that difficult goals, if accepted, result in better performance than 
do easy goals" (p. 840). Similarly, Locke et al. (1981) reviewed 
twenty-four field experiments, all of which reported individuals 
given specific, challenging goals either outperforming those trying 
to do their best or surpassing their own previous performance when 
they were not trying for specific goals. Personnel engaged in a wide 
range of work activities have been covered like marketing and produc­
tion workers (Ivancevich, 1974), logging crews (Latham and Kinne, 
1974), wood workers (Latham and Yukl, 1975b), managerial training 
(Wexley and Nemeroff, 1975), truck loading (Latham and Baldes, 1975), 
sales personnel (Ivancevich, 1976), telephone service jobs (Kim and 
Hamner, 1976), typing (Latham and Yukl, 1976), coding land parcels 
(Umstot, Bell, and Mitchell, 1976), maintenance technicians 
(Ivancevich, 1977), card sorting (White, Mitchell, and Bell, 1977), 
performance appraisal activities (Nemeroff and Cosentino, 1979), 
survey returns (Nevin and Ford, 1976; Dossett, Latham, and Saari, 
1980), etc.
In spite of such widespread support, it is surprising that 
there is only one study which explicitly uses goal setting in an 
industrial safety situation (Reber, 1982). While goal setting might 
have played a role in four other recent studies relating to safety 
(Komaki et al., 1978, 1980, 1982; and Haynes, Pine, and Fitch, 1982), 
the articles did not make any mention of this. An attempt to explain 
at least one of those studies (Komaki et al., 1978) on the goal 
setting premise was made (Locke, 1980) but it remains a matter of 
opinion (Komaki, 1981).. Considering the "ubiquity of the technique
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of goal setting in theories and approaches to employee motivation" 
(Locke, 1978) and the very few studies applying goal setting to 
safety in a field setting, the explicit use of goal setting in the 
present study is expected to help in further enhancing the external 
validity of goal setting (Campbell and Stanley, 1966).
Feedback-Knowledge of Results (KR)
The usefulness of feedback in improving performance has been 
described as "perhaps one of the most dependable and thoroughly- 
tested principles in modern-day psychology" and has been found to 
hold for animals, human beings; children, adults; individuals, 
groups; and for a wide variety of learning, psychomotor, monitoring, 
and other general performance tasks (Chapanis, 1964). Its necessity 
for learning and for motivation in performance-oriented organizations 
has also been accepted (Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor, 1979). A number 
of reviews of literature over a period of time support these con­
clusions (Adams, 1968; Ammons, 1954; Ammons, 1956; Annett, 1969; 
Bilodeau and Bilodeau, 1961; Sassenrath, 1975). Fairly consistent 
results have been achieved about the efficacy of feedback to enhance 
performance in laboratory studies (Church and Camp, 1965; Leamon,
1974) and also in the field (Payne and Hauty, 1955; Hundal, 1969; 
Panyan, Boozer, and Morris, 1970; Adam, 1972; Braunstein, Klein, and 
Pachla, 1973; Quilitch, 1975; Catano, 1976; Seligman and Darley, 
1977).
Feedback has been reported to serve different functions while 
helping in the improvement of performance. These have been variously
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called informing, rewarding, and motivating (Ammons, 1954); directive 
and incentive (Payne and Hauty, 1955); and cueing (Locke, Cartledge, 
and Koeppel, 1968). In general terms, informational feedback pro­
vides the person information about the correctness or acceptability 
of his/her behavior, response, or performance; the type, extent, and 
direction of his/her errors; and/or way(s) of improving the 
performance or achieving the correct or desired response. The 
individual can, thus, use this information to correct errors or to 
improve the method of performing the task. Motivational feedback, 
on the other hand, may facilitate performance by motivating the 
individual to try harder or persist longer at the task. This refers 
simply to providing the individual information about his/her per­
formance score; the term "knowledge of results" (KR) being used, at 
times, to distinguish it from informational feedback. Motivational 
feedback or KR may also have an incentive value when it is possible 
to compare the performance score with an established or given 
standard. It may even serve a shaping and/or a reinforce­
ment function if it indicates to the individual either that a 
desired level of performance has been achieved or that there is an 
improvement in performance in the desired direction (Bilodeau and 
Bilodeau, 1961; Chapanis, 1964; Hundal, 1969; Campbell and Pritchard, 
1976). Another operational distinction between the two types is that 
while the former can be provided through a variety of means like 
display of praise, displeasure, recognition, etc.; the latter is best 
provided by simple knowledge of score or results.
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Knowledge of Results and Goal Setting
While the effects of knowledge of results seemed to be quite 
well established, Locke's (1968) contention in his "Theory of Task 
Motivation and Incentives," that the effects of knowledge of results 
on performance were mediated by goal setting; created some con­
troversy. Four laboratory studies (Locke and Bryan, 1966; Locke, 
1967; Locke and Bryan, 1967a; and Locke and Bryan, 1967b) were cited 
in support of this contention and it was maintained that
the important thing about KS (knowledge of score), then, is 
not merely whether it is given or not given but how a subject 
interprets and evaluates it, and what goals he sets in
response to it ... if KS is given in such a form that it
cannot be used to set goals or to judge one's progress in
relation to a standard, it will not affect motivation
(Locke, 1968, p. 177).
Two other laboratory studies were conducted by Locke and Bryan (1968, 
1969) and a number of previous studies were reviewed and interpreted 
by Locke, Cartledge, and Koeppel (1968) and the above conclusions 
were reaffirmed. A major implication of this conclusion that goal 
setting is a necessary condition of feedback (KR) to have any moti­
vational effects, is that if a person or a group can be made to 
change his/her/their conscious goal(s) and accept the changed goals, 
that should be enough to motivate, change, and/or enhance behavior 
and performance and there should be no need for any other extrinsic 
incentives such as feedback (KR) or monetary incentives. The empiri­
cal support for this implication is, however, mixed particularly 
with regard to monetary incentives. A number of studies have 
indicated that monetary incentives may have effects on behavior 
and performance independent of and over and above the effects of goal
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setting alone (Pritchard and Curts, 1973; London and Oldham, 1976; 
Terborg, 1976; Terborg and Miller, 1978). This points to the 
possibility that feedback (KR) may even have some effects on 
performance independent of goal setting.
In a review of the research literature on the application of 
goal setting and feedback in organizations, Latham and Yukl (1975a) 
identified four different reasons for which feedback or knowledge of 
results could lead to an increase in effort and performance: a) KR
inducing an individual who previously did not have specific goals to 
set a goal to improve performance by a certain amount; b) KR inducing 
an individual to raise his/her goal level after attaining a previous 
goal; c) KR informing an individual that his/her current effort level 
is insufficient to attain the goal, thus resulting in greater level 
of effort, and d) KR informing an individual of ways of improving the 
methods of performing the task. The last is the same as the informa­
tional feedback referred to earlier and the first three refer to the 
motivational aspects of feedback. The first three conclusions also 
indicate that any/all motivational effects of feedback (KR) are 
through goal setting. After citing six more studies (Cummings, 
Schwab, and Rosen, 1971; Wilsted and Hand, 1974; Hundal, 1969; 
Chapanis, 1964; Kolb, Winters, and Berlew, 1968; Steers, 1975) and 
noting the paucity of field studies; the review concluded that while 
the results tended to support the conclusion "that frequent, relevant 
feedback is needed for a successful goal setting program, the 
evidence is limited, and further research clearly is warranted" 
(Latham and Yukl, 1975a, p. 837).
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There have, however, been a number of studies conducted 
primarily to test the effects of goal setting which have provided 
feedback (KR) in addition to goal setting on the assumption that 
while feedback (KR) may not have any independent effect of its own on 
performance in addition to goal setting, it was needed for goal 
setting to be effective (Dachler and Mobley, 1973; Latham and Kinne, 
1974; Latham and Baldes, 1975; Latham and Yukl, 1975b; Wexley and 
Nemeroff, 1975; Yukl and Latham, 1975; Campbell and Ilgen, 1976; 
Umstot, Mitchell, and Bell, 1970; Latham et al., 1978; Latham and 
Saari, 1979; Dossett et al., 1979).
Erez (1977), however, took an almost diametrically opposite 
position and opined that goals might be related to performance only 
when feedback (KR) is available. This was done following Lewin’s 
famous dictum that behavior is a function of the interaction of both 
the individual (cognitive intentions-goals) and the environment 
(feedback). Using a clerical aptitude test as the task for her 
laboratory study, she was the first one to conclude that "feedback 
(is) a necessary condition for goals to affect performance" (Erez, 
1977, p. 624). A similar laboratory study was conducted by Strang, 
Lawrence, and Fowler (1978) using an arithmetic computation task and 
the time to finish as a criterion. They also concluded that not only 
feedback (KR) was a necessary condition for goal setting to improve 
subsequent performance but also that goals without KR might even 
inhibit accurate performance (Strang, et. al., 1978). Two field 
studies, one by Becker (1978) about residential electricity use and 
the other by Kim and Hamner (1976) using cost and safety performance
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of blue collar unionized workers, reported similar conclusions about 
the necessity of KR for goals to affect performance.
The conclusions of the above studies combined with the 
suggestions that a) feedback (KR) may add meaning to task goals
(Annett, 1969; Latham and Kinne, 1974; Steers and Porter, 1974; Erez, 
1977; Locke, 1980); b) the comparison of feedback (KR) about past 
performance with a standard or goal may affect future performance 
through goals (Hall and Hall, 1976; Hall and Foster, 1977); and c) 
feedback (KR) may also provide information about the amount of future 
effort required to achieve a set or desired level of performance or 
output (Becker, 1978; Latham and Yukl, 1975a) highlight the 
importance of feedback (KR) in relation to goal setting and
performance. Two other recent field studies further confirms this
(Ivancevich and McMahon, 1982, Reber, 1982). After reviewing all the 
available studies, laboratory as well as field, on goal setting and 
task performance between 1969 and 1980, Locke et al. (1981) have
reported one of their major conclusions to be that "both goals and KR 
are necessary to improve performance" (p. 136).
Considering the applicability and efficacy of feedback (KR) 
to improve performance and its importance in learning, training, 
etc., its use has also been extended to the field of industrial/ 
occupational safety. Recently, a number of studies have been 
reported which have used either one or both of the informational and 
motivational aspects of feedback, at times in combination with praise 
and even punitive control in a wide variety of settings from metal 
fabrication to food processing, textile mills to coal mines, ship­
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yards, university laboratory, etc. (Komaki et al., 1978; Smith et 
al., 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff, 1980; Komaki et al., 1980, Rhoton, 1980; 
Sulzer-Azaroff and Santamaria, 1980; Zohar, 1980; Zohar et al., 
1980; Haynes et al., 1982, Komaki et al., 1982; Reber, 1982). 
While all these studies have made explicit use of feedback-knowledge 
of results, attempts have been made to explain or reinterpret at 
least one of the studies (Komaki et al., 1978) in terms of joint 
operation of implicit goals and feedback (Locke, 1980) but this has 
also been disputed, at least in part (Komaki, 1981). Two studies 
have also attempted component analyses, one between training and 
feedback (Komaki et al., 1980) and the other between training, goal 
setting, and feedback (knowledge of results) (Reber, 1982). However, 
Reber's (1982) study is the only one to have used goal setting and 
knowledge of results together in a field study on safety. The over­
all conclusion appears to be that a combination of training with goal 
setting and feedback (KR) both should be the most effective way of 
improving safe behavior.
Feedback Frequency
In spite of the well established use of feedback in improving 
performance or behavior and the large and varied literature on the 
subject, there are few generalizations about the effects of feed­
back on individuals and a number of fundamental questions have not 
been resolved (Payne and Haughty, 1955; Ilgen et al., 1979). Con­
sidering feedback as a multidimensional stimulus and taking a process 
view, Ilgen et al. (1979) have emphasized those aspects of feedback
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which influence a) the way it is perceived, b) its acceptance by the 
recipient, and c) the willingness of the recipient to respond to the 
feedback. Intrinsic motivation, a sense of competence, and personal 
control, are considered to be some of the factors which influence the 
individual's willingness or desire to respond. According to Deci's 
(1972, 1975) work on intrinsic motivation, individuals seek a sense 
of competence on a job/task and this sense of competence becomes a 
powerful reward for the individual (White, 1959). The ability or 
opportunity to evaluate performance is essential to developing a 
feeling of competence. This ability or opportunity to judge 
performance is often provided by feedback either internally (from 
the task itself) or externally. In the job design literature also, 
the motivating potential of a job is considered to be greater, the 
greater the feedback provided on a job (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). 
Increased feedback should, thus, help in increasing a sense of com­
petence with a consequent improvement in intrinsic motivation. On 
the other hand, personal control is also a necessary condition for 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975). Personal control can be described 
as an individual's feeling that she/he has chosen freely to engage in 
a particular behavior or a set of behaviors and is considered 
greatest when the individual believes that he/she is engaging in a 
particular behavior solely because he/she likes to do so. The rela­
tionship of feedback, particularly of the frequency of feedback, 
to a feeling of personal control is opined to be opposite to 
that of a sense of competence (Ilgen et al., 1979). This is based 
on the view that the individual's behavior and/or performance need to
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be monitored or observed in some way for provision of feedback 
contingent on behavior and/or performance and, therefore, as the fre­
quency of contingent feedback increases, the feeling of personal 
control would decline as the recipient feels more controlled by the 
source of feedback. This loss of personal control would decrease the 
intrinsic motivation, thus, reducing the individual's desire or will­
ingness to respond to feedback. This is almost parallel to the 
findings in the Path-Goal theory of leadership in which only those 
subordinates who lacked structure were satisfied with structuring 
behavior by the leader, while in a structured situation, similar 
behavior by the leader created dissatisfaction as it was perceived as 
unnecessary control (House, 1971). There is also evidence that for 
intrinsic motivation in a job to be high, both a sense of competence 
and a feeling of personal control have to be high (Fisher, 1978).
The above considerations of the two interacting and competing 
mechanisms of feedback bring out the need to question the generally 
accepted notion that more is always better. One of the major impli­
cations of this for feedback in work environment is that in some 
cases "increasing feedback frequency may not only fail to improve 
performance but actually may be detrimental to it" (Ilgen et al., 
1979, p. 367). It is in view of the above that Ilgen et al. (1979) 
conclude that "research is needed that investigates the effect of 
the frequency of feedback" (p. 366). While Komaki and her associates 
have used feedback in some of their studies, the frequency issue has 
not really been investigated. Its importance has, however, been 
recognized as is evident from a recent observation that "a systematic
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investigation of the frequency of feedback would benefit future 
programs in work settings" (Komaki et al., 1980, p. 268). Even Locke 
et al. (1981) have noted the almost complete absense of studies on 
various dimensions of feedback, concluding that "clearly more
research is needed on feedback, especially research based on the
issues ... such as timing, frequency, source, interpretation, and so 
on" (p. 146).
SUMMARY
The above review of the literature brings out the following: 
Safety is an important social issue and attempts to 
reduce accidents and injuries in industrial/occupational 
settings are desirable.
Human acts and behavior are major contributors to 
accidents and provide a major opportunity for improving 
safety in work place by concentrating on increasing safe 
behaviors.
Applied behavior analysis is eminently suitable for 
increasing safe behaviors in industrial settings.
Goal setting and feedback taken together are effective in 
improving performance and changing behavior in work 
settings.
More research is needed on the effects of the frequency 
of feedback on behavior/performance.
In view of the above, this study investigated the effects of 
an applied behavior analysis safety program in a field setting, in an
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organization which already had a fairly comprehensive, conventional 
safety program in operation. The hypotheses of interest were:
1. The average behavioral safety performance of employees 
after they have been trained to perform safe behaviors and 
a specific and difficult yet attainable goal for safe 
behavior has been set, will be greater than the average 
behavioral safety performance before such training and
goal setting.
2. The average behavioral safety performance will be greater 
when the employees are provided with feedback about their 
performance in addition to training and goal setting, as 
compared to the average behavioral safety performance 
without feedback and with only training and goal setting.
In addition, the study also investigated the effects of
changing the frequency of feedback in a field setting concerning 
safety. While it was not possible to formulate any specific
hypotheses about this at the outset, it has been possible to come up
with some preliminary conclusions regarding the optimum frequency of 
feedback after the study.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
THE SAMPLE/SETTING
The study was conducted in a heat exchanger manufacturing and 
repairing plant in southeastern U.S.A. The plant consisted of three 
shops: machine shop, boiler shop, and weld shop. While the pre­
paratory work was done in the machine shop and the weld shop; 
assembling and dismantling were done in the boiler shop. Appendix I 
depicts the relative layout of the three shops.
The plant had a formal safety program in operation since 
1977. It was a fairly standard, conventional program based on seven 
elements: safety policy and responsibility, management leadership
and commitment, maintaining safe working conditions, safety training, 
accident investigation, first aid and hygiene, employee accounta­
bility and motivation. A Supervisor’s Safety and Loss Prevention 
Manual had been issued with a built-in program for training in and 
implementation of safety and loss prevention. Blanks for job safety 
analysis (JSA), employee safety meeting, employee safety record, 
supervisor's safety committee report, safety inspection report, and 
monthly safety appraisal were available. A rather brief set of 
safety rules were in existence and safety standards on four subjects 
had been issued. The plan was to formulate and issue standards
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gradually. Two main on-going activities were weekly safety meetings 
and a safety competition among the employees in the plant. A brief—  
about 5 to 10 minutes— safety meeting was held at the start of each 
shift (day and night) every Tuesday in which one safety issue was 
discussed each week. The supervisors took turns in addressing the 
meeting, one each week. The topics covered a very broad range from 
safety at work to safety at home and even safety in driving, etc. 
The other main activity was called the Group Incentive Safety 
Program. Points were given to employees for violation of safety 
rules on a scale ranging from 25 points (for safety equipment being 
off) to 300 points (for hospital stay) and the group with the least 
number of points per man at the end of the year was rewarded. Based 
on the OSHA criteria of recordable cases incident rate and lost 
workday cases rate, the program had been quite successful with both 
these rates having come down well below the national averages for 
similar industries, as reported by the National Safety Council. The 
supervisors as well as the workers were, therefore, justifiably proud 
of their safety record.
Subjects
The plant employed a total of 58 workers (N=58). The boiler 
shop had the largest number of employees (29), followed by the 
machine shop with 15 and the weld shop with 14. The employees were 
almost equally divided between the day and night shifts with periodic 
rotations. Each of the shops had two foremen, one each for the day 
shift and the night shift. A plant superintendent supervised the
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overall operation. Demographic information on the employees is in 
Appendix II.
PROCEDURE
The outcome variable of interest in the study was the safe
behavior of the employees at work. It was operationalized in terms
of the percentage of employees performing their jobs in a completely 
safe manner. For arriving at this criterion variable, a behavior 
observation instrument was used.
The available accident reports of the plant over the last
five years (since 1977) were analyzed to determine as to what were 
the specific behaviors of employees which either caused or 
contributed to the accidents, and how should the employee have
behaved in order to prevent the occurrence of the accident. A list 
of key behaviors, which contributed to accidents most frequently, was 
thus developed. While some of the accident reports contained very 
graphic, explanatory, and informative descriptions of the incidents 
given by the supervisors, many of the reports were quite brief and 
routine. Some of the supervisors and employees were, therefore, 
consulted and their views and suggestions, based on their experience, 
were sought. Other sources of similar information like National 
Safety Council and American National Standards Institute recommenda­
tions, safety and accident prevention literature of similar 
companies, specific trade information like welding handbooks, recom­
mendations of tool and equipment manufacturers, etc. were also 
consulted. All this information was also supplemented by periodic
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personal observations. This led to some changes in the list of 
behaviors. The final outcome was a list of thirty-five key behaviors 
for observation. These were divided into standard safety categories 
like personal protective equipment, general safety, material 
handling, housekeeping, etc. In keeping with the attempt to stress 
the positive aspects and specificity of behavior, each item was 
described in behaviorally specific terms stressing the correct/safe 
way of behaving. This list of the thirty-five key behaviors for 
observation is in Appendix III. To enable convenient and unobtrusive 
observations, the list of key behaviors was abbreviated into a Safety 
Check List which had twenty-two sub-categories in the same five main 
categories. The check list was so designed that it could easily be 
carried on the person of an observer/supervisor and could be used as 
a reference or memory aid and be also used for scoring and recording 
the observation of behaviors. A copy of the check list is in 
Appendix IV.
Observation
Each employee was observed periodically to assess whether he 
was behaving safely or unsafely for all the items on the check list 
applicable to the activity being performed by the employee at the 
time of the observation. Those behaviors which the employee was 
performing safely were check marked (V) and those that were being 
performed unsafely were marked with a cross (x). The date, time of 
day, shop, and the activity being performed were also recorded on the 
safety check list. To protect confidentiality of individual employees
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and to guard against any possible recriminations, names of employees 
were not recorded. Depending on the average number of employees at 
work at any point in time, each observation session took about twenty 
to thirty minutes. Observations were made in full view of the 
employees but recording was done as unobtrusively as possible. 
Observations were made at different days of the week and at different 
times of day depending on operational and logistic considerations. 
While it was practically not possible to make the observation
sessions truly random in terms of time and work sampling etc.,
attempts were made to cover as many tasks and as many times as
possible within operational constraints. Considering the ten month
duration of the study, it is felt that such factors have, at worst,
only affected the observations minimally. A total of 323 observa­
tions were made during the ten month period of study.
Another observer was trained to make observations in
accordance with the behavioral check list and was asked to take 
concurrent but independent observations periodically during the 
entire course of the study to enable an assessment of inter-observer 
agreement as a check for observer bias or instrumentation effects. A 
total of 13 such checks were made during the study. In addition, two
such inter-rater reliability checks were made with the Plant
Superintendent as the additional observer, to validate that 
safe/unsafe behavior as perceived by the supervisor was the same as 
perceived by the investigator.
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Safety Score
The operationalized criterion variable— the percentage of 
employees performing their job in completely safe manner, was 
computed from the above observations. For this purpose, an employee 
was considered to be working safely only when he was scored safe (V) 
on all the behavioral safety items on the check list applicable to 
the activity being performed by the employee at the time of the 
observation. Safe performance of an activity, in this respect, was 
considered all or none. While an employee might have been working 
safely in accordance with most of the behavioral rules applicable to 
the activity being performed, but even if only one of the items was 
being violated, the employee was reckoned to be behaving in an unsafe 
manner. The safety performance of the plant was computed at the end 
of each observation session by dividing the number of employees 
working safely by the total number of employees observed and multi­
plying by 100. Such a measure of safety had a positive connotation 
by focusing on safe (desired) behavior rather than on negative, 
undesired (unsafe) behavior (Komaki et al., 1978, 1980, 1982; Reber,
1982). Safe and unsafe behavior were considered to be mutually 
exclusive. It, therefore, followed that increase in safe behavior 
would result in a corresponding and consequent decrease in unsafe 
behavior.
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
A "stair-step" type variation of the
basic reversal design was used for the study. The entire plant was 
treated as one group, and the study consisted of the following
phases:
A - Baseline
B - Training and Goal Setting
BC-^  - Training, Goal Setting; and Feedback once a week.
BC2  - Training, Goal Setting; and Feedback once in two weeks.
RevB - Reversal-Training and Goal Setting only.
RevBC2  - Training, Goal Setting, and Feedback once in two weeks.
Training consisted of showing the workers slides of the
unsafe and safe ways of performing various activities. Slides were 
prepared depicting normal, usual work situations in the plant itself, 
and featured some supervisors and workers. The rationale of making 
slides in the plant and featuring regular employees was to enable/ 
help the workers identify and associate themselves with the situation
more easily when they saw these slides as compared to some
standardized slides made either in some other plant or in some other 
simulated situations and featuring unknown people. Broadly, the 
slides represented the behaviors contained in the behavioral observa­
tion check list, with one slide showing the unsafe and the
accompanying slide showing the safe, way of performing an activity.
A brief description of each slide along with the behavioral item(s) 
it refers to is in Appendix VI.
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Goal setting consisted of setting a specific, hard (dif­
ficult) yet attainable and realistic goal for safe behavior 
percentage for the plant. On the basis of the baseline performance 
and in consultation with the management, a goal of 95 percent safe 
behavior was set. One hundred percent safe behavior was discussed 
as a possible goal but was not adopted as it was considered to be 
unrealistic and impractical.
The training and goal setting (B) intervention was done 
during a safety meeting held separately for the day and night shifts, 
at the beginning of each shift. During the meeting, the study was 
introduced and the employees were shown a series of 51 slides
(described in Appendix V). The slide showing unsafe behavior or the 
unsafe way of performing an operation was shown first followed by the 
slide showing the safe way of performing the same operation. This 
sequence was followed for all the slides with the unsafe/safe element 
in each slide being explained briefly. The goal of 95 percent safe 
behavior was introduced next and the employees were shown the 
12"xl5" Safe Behavior Goal sign (Appendix VI). The meeting ended 
with a question and answer period. The Safe Behavior Goal sign was 
posted at a prominent location (next to the punching clock and the 
"tool window"— a window of the tool room to which the employees came 
to get tools issued for use).
After five weeks, a safety quiz was administered in another 
safety meeting. During this meeting, the employees in attendance
were shown 8 slides (4 safe and 4 unsafe). For each slide, the
employees were asked to indicate whether the job/operation was being
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performed safely or unsafely and to record the safe or unsafe 
behavior, as the case might have been. The slides used for the quiz 
are identified in Appendix V.
The next phase (BC^) was to provide feedback about the safety 
performance once a week. This was done by providing feedback purely 
in its knowledge of results (KR) form graphically. For this purpose, 
a 10"xl5" sign was made with the abscissa labelled "WEEK/DATE" and 
the ordinate labeled "AVERAGE SAFETY PERFORMANCE (%)" (Appendix VII). 
The level of the set goal was highlighted by drawing a horizontal red 
line at 95%. The average level of safety performance observed and 
recorded for the Training and Goal Setting phase (B) was marked on 
the chart for the first week, thus providing the employees with their 
first feedback (KR) in relation to the goal or standard. The graph 
was shown to the employees in a safety meeting and the above features 
were explained. The employees were also advised that the level of 
safety performance based on observations made in the plant, will be 
marked/posted on the graph periodically. The graph was then posted 
just below the Safe Behavior Goal sign near the punching clock and 
the tool-issue-window which was a highly visible and heavily 
trafficked location. The investigator continued to post/mark the 
safety performance on the graph at the end of every week, based on 
the average safety performance during the week.
After the average behavioral safety performance had 
stabilized at a ceiling of around 96 percent, it was decided to 
reduce the frequency of feedback to once in two weeks. This was done 
in the next phase (BC^) in which everything else remained the same
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except that the investigator started marking/posting the average 
safety performance on the graph once every two weeks instead of every 
week as was done in the earlier phase.
As the average safety performance during the BC2  phase (feed­
back once in two weeks) remained approximately at the same level as 
the earlier BC^ phase (feedback once a week), it was decided to go 
back to the reversal phase of Training and Goal Setting only (RevB) 
with no feedback at all. For this purpose, the graph on which the 
average safety performance was being marked for providing feedback, 
was removed. The Safe Behavior Goal sign, however, remained in 
position.
Considering the finding that goals are effective in improving 
performance only if these are accepted (Locke et al., 1981), a check 
of goal acceptance was carried out toward the end of the reversal 
phase. This was done through the administration of a Safety Goal 
Questionnaire (Appendix VIII). This instrument had a three part 
format: a bipolar adjectives, semantic differential section; a
section with probability statements; and an open-ended comments 
section. It was adapted from an instrument used earlier to measure 
job related attitudes (Reber, 1982), psychometrics for and develop­
ment of which have been reported earlier (Scott, 1967; Scott and 
Rowland, 1970; Reitz, 1971). Very briefly, principal components 
analysis with orthogonal rotation with the varimax criterion was used 
(Scott, 1967). The instrument for the current study was adapted to 
measure goal acceptance and commitment, perceived goal difficulty, 
existence of implicit goals different from the set goal, effects of
45
feedback frequency, etc. A pilot study of the questionnaire was done 
with the vice president, plant superintendent, and other supervisors 
for verification and face validity. The questionnaire was adminis­
tered during a safety meeting.
In view of the fact that there did not appear to be any 
change in the average behavioral safety performance from feedback 
once a week (BC^) to feedback once in two weeks (BC2 ), it was decided 
that the last phase of the study would be RevBC2 — feedback once in 
two weeks. For this purpose, the feedback graph was put up again at 
the same location— below the safe behavior goal sign, and the average 
behavioral safety performance was posted/marked on it every two 
weeks.
The length of the phases ranged from four to eight weeks. 
Each phase was checked for stability of the response before starting 
with the next phase. This was done by splitting the observations of 
the phase into two halves and by computing the means of both the 
halves and comparing these means of the halves with the overall mean 
of the entire phase. If the means of the halves were within ten 
percent of the overall mean of the entire phase, the response was 
considered to have stabilized (Hersen and Barlow, 1967; Williamson,
1983).
The percentage safety performance data was analyzed both 
graphically and statistically. The graphic analysis consisted of 
visual inspection of the graphed data across various phases of the 
study. The statistical analysis consisted of the auto-regressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis applicable to such time
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series data (Box and Jenkins, 1976; McCain and McCleary, 1979; Glass, 
Wilson, and Gottman, 1975; Jones, Vaught, and Weinrott, 1977). This 
technique first estimates a model appropriate for the data, checks 
the data for serial dependencies through time, correlated error, 
nonstationary processes, estimates parameters for removing such 
effects through transformations, and gives a forecast of corrected 
data. The corrected data from ARIMA analysis was further analyzed 
through an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to check for statistically 
significant differences in safety performance across successive 
phases. Phase means were tested for significant differences through 
Duncan's multiple range test and paired comparisons of means were 
done through Tukey's method.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
OBSERVATIONAL RELIABILITY
To estimate the reliability of the observation and recording 
procedure, interrater reliability or interobserver agreement was 
assessed using the percentage agreement method (Komaki et al., 1980). 
According to this method, an agreement resulted when two observers 
scored an employee's behavior on the check list identically. In case 
there were any differences in the scoring of the two observers, 
however small, it was considered to be a disagreement. The following 
formula was used:
Number of employees
Interrater Reliability , scored identically
or - (or the number of agreements)
T . , * . Total number of employees observedInterobserver Agreement , ., , c i° (.or the number of agreements plus
the number of disagreements)
The above checks were made a total of thirteen times during 
the course of the study, at least once during each phase by the 
investigator and the additional observer. The average interobserver 
agreement for these thirteen checks was 93.41%. The average 
interobserver agreement between the investigator and the Plant Super­
intendent was 89.74%. The overall interobserver agreement of the 
entire study was 92.95%.
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MANIPULATION CHECKS 
Training
The Safety Quiz administered toward the end of the Training 
and Goal Setting phase (B), was designed as a test of knowledge of 
safe behavior, to check and demonstrate the retention of training. 
The results of the quiz indicated that overall 88.18% of the 
employees (N=55) identified the "safe" slides correctly, 98.64% 
identified the "unsafe" slides correctly, and 94.44% identified the 
unsafe behavior in the "unsafe" slides correctly.
Goal Characteristics
The responses to the Safety Goal Questionnaire administered 
during the reversal phase of Training and Goal Setting only were 
scored on a 7-point scale with one being the desired response. (See 
Appendix VIII for details of scaling and response formats.) A total 
of forty-two employees responded to the questionnaire.
The mean responses indicated the acceptance of and commitment 
to the goal to be quite high (X=1.74 and 1.98 respectively). While 
the goal was considered to be very important (X=1.38) and useful 
(X=l.69), it was not perceived to be very difficult (X=4.45). The 
goal was also considered to be clear (X=2.41) and specific (X=2.64). 
The probability of existence of implicit goals lower than the set 
goal was considered low (X=4.79) whereas it was possible that some 
higher implicit goals were in existence (X=3.38). Employees were 
fairly certain that getting feedback once a week helped improve 
the safety performance (X=2.38) but responses about comparison of
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feedback once a week with feedback twice a week were generally 
uncertain (X=4.52, 3.86, 4.00). Detailed results are in Table 1.
OBSERVATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS
The observational data was plotted graphically (Figure 1). A 
visual inspection showed that the behaviorally safety performance 
increased markedly during phase B--Training and Goal Setting— as 
compared to the baseline (Phase A). A further increase is noticed 
from phase B— Training and Goal Setting— to phase BC^ when feedback 
about the average safety performance was provided once a week. There 
seemed to be no noticeable change in the behavioral safety per­
formance from phase BC^ (when feedback was provided once a week) to 
phase BC2  when feedback was provided once in two weeks. When 
feedback was withdrawn in phase RevB, the safety performance seemed 
to go down appreciably. When feedback once in two weeks was 
reintroduced in phase RevBC2 > performance gradually increased to 
levels apparently equal to the earlier two feedback phases--BC^ and 
BC2 — when feedback had been provided once a week and once in two 
weeks respectively.
ARIMA Analysis
The first step in the statistical analysis of the observa­
tional data was the estimation of a model that best fit the data. 
This was done by using the auto-regressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) analysis applicable to such time series data (Box and 
Jenkins, 1976; McCain and McCleary, 1979; Glass, Wilson and Gottman,
TABLE 1
SUMMARY RESPONSES TO SAFETY GOAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Item
Response
Goal
Acceptance
1.74
Goal
Commitment
1.98
Goal
Perceived
Goal
Importance Difficulty
1.38 4.45
Goal
Clarity
2.41
Goal Goal
Specificity Usefulness
2.64 1.69
Item Existence of
implicit goal 
lower than 
set goal
Existence of 
implicit goal 
higher than 
set goal
Feedback once 
a week helped 
improve per­
formance
Feedback once 
in two weeks 
better than 
once a week
Feedback once 
in two weeks 
same as once 
a week
Feedback once 
in two weeks 
worse than 
once a week
Response 4.79 3.38 2.38 4.52 3.86 4.00
Note: All items scored on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being the desired response.
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1975; Jones, Vaught, and Weinrott, 1977). As visual inspection of 
graphed data (Figure 1) indicated marked intervention effects, it was 
decided to perform ARIMA analysis on the observational data for each 
phase (McCain and McCleary, 1979).
The plots of autocorrelations, inverse autocorrelations, and 
partial autocorrelations generated by the ARIMA analysis indicated a 
stationary process for three phases with no statistically significant 
secular trend. In other words, there were no statistically sig­
nificant serial dependencies, correlated error, or non-stationary 
processes in the data for these three phases. This indicated that 
the series consisted "entirely of random shocks, which, by defini­
tion, are uncorrelated with each other" (McCain and McCleary, 1979, 
p. 244). The plots for one of the remaining three phases indicated 
an autoregressive component and those of the other two indicated non- 
stationarity and a moving average component. The data for these 
three phases were transformed to remove these effects. The corrected 
data from these three phases and the original data of the other three 
phases were then tested through the autocorrelation check of 
residuals. The Q-statistic, which basically is a chi-square good- 
ness-of-fit test for the autocorrelation function, was not 
significant for any of the phases (McCain and McCleary, 1979). (See 
Appendix IX for details.) It was, therefore, concluded that the data 
resembled random fluctuations. In summary, the corrected data did 
not have any non-stationary processes or autoregressive and moving 
average components. In other words, there were no statistically
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significant serial dependencies, correlated error, or non-stationar- 
ity in the corrected data.
ANOVA
In view of the above conclusion of the data resembling random
fluctuations in each phase, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure
was used for testing the hypotheses. This revealed a highly sig­
nificant effect for the phase of the study (F=301.37, df=5,
p<0.0001). Detailed ANOVA results are in Appendix X. Duncan's 
multiple range test was then performed on the phase means. This 
revealed that except for the means for phases BC-^  and RevBC2 —
feedback once a week and reversal-feedback once in two weeks, the 
means for each of the other phases were significantly different. 
Paired comparisons of the means through Tukey's method revealed that 
except for the pairwise comparisons between the means of phases BCp 
BC2 , and RevBC2 — feedback once a week, feedback once in two weeks, 
and reversal-feedback once in two weeks— all the other comparisons 
were significant. Inspection of means for each phase (Table 2) 
indicated that the differences were in the hypothesized directions. 
Specifically, the mean behavioral safety performance after training 
and goal setting phase--B--(X=80.92%) was greater than the mean 
performance during baseline phase— A— (X=65.21%) without training and 
goal setting. This supports the first hypothesis that the average 
behavioral safety performance of employees after they have been 
trained to perform safe behaviors and a specific and difficult yet
TABLE 2
AVERAGE BEHAVIORAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
FOR VARIOUS PHASES
A
B
BC1
b c2
RevB
Phase
Baseline
Training and Goal Setting
Training, Goal Setting, and 
Feedback once a week
Training, Goal Setting, and 
Feedback once in two weeks
Reversal-Training and Goal 
Setting only
RevBC2 - Training, Goal Setting, and 
Feedback once in two weeks
Performance
65.21%
80.92%
94.58%
96.78%
89.11%
93.91%
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attainable goal for safe behavior has been set, will be greater than 
the average behavioral safety performance before such training and 
goal setting.
The performance during the first feedback phase (BC-^ ) when 
feedback was provided once a week (X=94.58%) was greater than during 
the preceeding training and goal setting phase— B— (X=80.92%). Also, 
the performance during the second feedback phase (BC2 ) when feedback 
was provided once in two weeks (X=96.78%) was greater than the 
performance in the succeeding reversal-training and goal setting only 
phase— RevB--(X=89.11%), and the performance in the final feedback 
once in two weeks phase— RevBC2 — (X=93.91%) was greater than the 
performance in the preceeding reversal-training and goal setting only 
phase— RevB)— (X=89.11%). This supports the second hypothesis that 
the average behavioral safety performance will be greater when the 
employees are provided with feedback about their performance in 
addition to training and goal setting, as compared to the average 
behavioral safety performance without feedback and with only training 
and goal setting.
The performance during the first two feedback phases (BC^ 
and BC2 ) when feedback was provided once a week and once in two 
weeks respectively was not significantly different from each other 
(Xfic =94.58%, Xg^ =96.78%) and was also not significantly different 
from the performance in the final feedback once in two weeks 
phase--RevBC2"(X=93.91%). This leads to the preliminary conclusion
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about the third exploratory hypothesis that given the specific 
situation and limitations of this particular study, the optimum 
feedback frequency appears to be once in two weeks. This issue is 
further discussed in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
The major finding of this study concerns feedback and its 
frequency. The result that, in terms of its effect on safe behavior 
performance, providing feedback once in two weeks was about as good 
as providing it once a week, appears to support the theoretical posi­
tion of Ilgen et al. (1979) that more may not always be better. 
While the results of this investigation do not support the hypothesis 
of Ilgen et al. (1979) that "increasing feedback frequency ... 
actually may be detrimental to it (performance)" (p. 367), they do 
point to the existence of some optimum frequency of feedback (not 
necessarily, the most frequent) which would result in a desirable 
level of performance. This is an important practical consideration 
particularly from the cost-benefit point of view. If the same 
performance level can be achieved and maintained with a reduced 
frequency of feedback, it would obviously result in a better cost- 
benefit ratio.
While the observational data did not result in any sig­
nificant differences in the safety performance level for the two 
feedback frequencies, responses to the Safety Goal Questionnaire were 
not as clear-cut. As mentioned before, while the employees were
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fairly certain that getting feedback once a week helped improve the 
behavioral safety performance, their responses about comparison of 
feedback once a week with feedback once in two weeks were in and 
around the uncertain range. This uncertainty can be attributed to 
the manner in which feedback was provided. It is possible that the 
employees associated putting up of the Safe Behavior Performance 
chart with the provision of feedback and were not able to distinguish 
between feedback being provided once a week and once in two weeks. 
In other words, as long as the performance chart was displayed, the 
employees felt that feedback was being provided and used the marked 
performance level for reference/comparison, without worrying or 
thinking about the frequency with which it was being posted on the 
chart. The reduction in safety performance during the reversal phase 
when feedback was withdrawn seems very significant. This is 
particularly so because of the high level of safety awareness on the 
part of the employees in the plant and the fact that they had 
demonstrated their ability to distinguish between safe and unsafe 
behaviors. Supervisory involvement in safety was already high even 
before the study began and continued at approximately the same level 
throughout the period of the study. This tends to highlight the 
effect and importance of feedback on performance.
The results also supported the first two hypotheses as the 
average behavioral safety performance after training and goal setting 
was higher than during baseline (before training and goal setting) 
and the performance with feedback was higher than without feed­
back. Support of the first hypothesis provides external validity of
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the applicability of goal setting to improve performance (Locke et 
al., 1981; Reber, 1982). The goal of 95 percent safe behavior set in 
the study was specific, realistic, and attainable. One hundred 
percent safe behavior was not expected as it was considered 
impractical and unrealistic. While the employees did not perceive 
the goal to be difficult, it was considered to be difficult enough 
when it was set. The acceptance of and commitment to the goal on the 
part of the employees were quite high. The support of the second 
hypothesis enhances the external validity of feedback being useful in 
improving performance (Arnett, 1974; Erez, 1977; Strang et al., 1978; 
Reber, 1982). The feedback provided was concrete, specific, and 
objective in as much as it was based on an observation code 
consisting of specific, pin-pointed behaviors, and was recorded by an 
outside observer. It highlighted safe behavior and not unsafe 
behavior or the number of accidents and was, thus, positive. It was 
also indicative of the corrective action to be taken as the employees 
knew how to improve the performance and was, therefore, influencable. 
The results of this study also tend to support Locke et al.'s (1981) 
latest conclusion that "both goals and KR (feedback) are necessary to 
improve performance" (p. 136).
The study also provided some insight into the mechanism 
through which goal setting helps improve performance. The day after 
the Safe Behavior Goal sign displaying the goal of 95% safe 
behavior was posted, some one scribbled 99.9% on the wall just below 
the sign. While this might have been a case of graffiti, it could 
even be interpreted that the mere setting of a 95% safe behavior goal
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provided some motivation to strive for an even higher goal. This was 
also brought out in the Safety Goal Questionnaire responses as it was 
considered fairly probable that most employees were trying to achieve 
an implicit goal higher than the set goal of 95% safe behavior. 
Although training and goal setting were introduced together in this 
study, the above does seem to support Locke's (1968) contention that 
setting specific goals which are accepted, serves to enhance the 
motivation of individuals to increase their efforts in order to 
achieve the set goals.
Some observations can also be made about the mechanism of 
feedback in improving performance. One suggested mechanism is 
through the individuals setting new standards or goals in relation/ 
response to feedback (Latham and Yukl, 1975a; Locke, 1968, 1980). 
This appears to be supported by the questionnaire responses about 
most employees trying to achieve an implicit goal higher than the set 
goal and the scribbling of 99.9% just below the Safe Behavior Goal 
sign. It is possible that being safety conscious, the employees felt 
that they could not only achieve the goal of 95% safe behavior but 
could even exceed it and, thus, set a higher goal for themselves. 
Another possible mechanism is that feedback might result in an 
increase in the effort the individual makes to achieve the goal 
(Becker, 1978; Latham and Yukl, 1975a). This does seem to be the 
case in this study as the performance reached the set goal level only 
after feedback was provided. It is possible that provision of feed­
back made the employees feel that more effort on their part is needed 
if the goal is to be achieved. Yet another suggested mechanism is
through the reinforcing function performed by feedback when it 
indicates either achievement of a set standard or goal or progress 
toward it (Hall and Hall, 1976; Hall and Foster, 1977). The facts 
that performance continued around the goal level with feedback being 
provided either weekly or once in two weeks, that performance 
declined during reversal when feedback was withdrawn and rose again 
when feedback was re-introduced, may be an indication that the 
employees felt reinforced when they found themselves moving toward 
goal achievement. In addition, employees seemed quite keen and 
interested to know their performance level whenever it was marked on 
the chart and also on the basis of occassional questions which the 
employees asked the investigator. Some of the comments the employees 
made to the investigator also indicated that feedback signifying 
improved safety performance was considered satisfying and a source of 
pride. Another indication of employee acceptance of and interest in 
the program was the fact that the goal setting sign and the feedback 
graph, although easily and constantly accessible, were never 
disfigured or mutilated.
Other theoretical contributions of the study are in the area 
of methodological improvements. The study used a reversal/withdrawal 
type of design which is considered superior to the multiple baseline 
design as observed earlier (Hersen and Barlow, 1976). In addition, 
the study covered the entire plant and not just some of the depart­
ments as most other, earlier studies had done and which had 
specifically been recommended (Komaki et al., 1982). The ten-month 
duration of the study and the fact that feedback was in operation for
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almost seven months, improves the shortcomings of some earlier 
studies which had recommended studying these effects over relatively 
longer periods of time.
In terms of practical implications in the area of industrial/ 
occupational safety, this study confirms the applicability of a 
behavioral approach to safety. The approach consists of identifying 
and pinpointing specific behaviors which represent the safe way of 
performing various tasks in a given situation. Training employees in 
these safe behaviors and subsequent periodic monitoring with feed­
back, seems to be a more effective way of enhancing safety than 
putting up generalized safety posters, slogans or conducting 
standardized safety audits. The focus on desired or safe performance 
has a positive connotation and can be used to actively promote safety 
as these behaviors are frequently and regularly engaged in. This is 
in contrast to the conventional approach to safety where attempts are 
made to avoid or reduce accidents (which, themselves, are essentially 
infrequent occurrences) through reliance on controlling physical 
conditions, environment, etc. Such a conventional approach has its 
own advantages and that is why the behavioral approach is considered 
to be complementary to the conventional approach.
While this is a generalization of the findings of Komaki et 
al. (1980) and Reber (1982), there are some essential differences. 
Both these earlier studies were conducted in organizations which did 
not have well established and formalized safety programs in operation 
when these studies were started and did not cover the entire 
organizations. Both the studies used multiple baseline designs. The
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present study, on the other hand, was conducted in an organization
which already had a well established and formalized conventional
safety program in operation, covered the entire plant, and used a
variation of the basic reversal design. It also covered some other
issues which had been identified as areas of further research by the
earlier studies. As Komaki et al. (1980) observed
it would also be interesting to assess the effects of such 
variables as providing information regarding employee 
behaviors rather than accident indices, presenting informa­
tion on a group rather than an individual basis ... and 
publicly rather than privately posting feedback (p. 269).
The major practical contribution of the study was to assess 
whether a behaviorally based safety program can complement an 
on-going, conventional safety program. The outcome of the present 
study seemed to indicate that this, indeed, was the case. Evidence 
to this effect and a form of social validation of the program became 
available when towards the end of the study, the management of the 
plant asked for the investigator's permission for adopting the 
program on a regular basis.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the above discussion, the findings of this study can 
be summarized as follows:
1. It is possible to improve performance through a combina­
tion of training, goal setting, and feedback as a package 
of applied behavior analysis.
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2. Providing feedback can help improve performance over and 
above the level achieved with only training and goal
setting.
3. It may not be necessary for feedback to be as frequent as 
possible to sustain a given, desired level of per­
formance. It is possible to sustain a desired level of 
performance with some optimum frequency which may be less 
than the most frequent possible. While this may have
important cost-benefit implications particularly in
applied settings, a word of caution seems to be in order. 
In most work settings, the general experience seems to be 
that there is not enough feedback and, therefore, any 
increase in the frequency of feedback would appear to be 
beneficial (Ilgen et al., 1979). In the current study, 
perhaps it was the employees' awareness of safety which 
resulted in maintaining the performance at the desired 
level even with reduced frequency of feedback.
Limitations and Suggestions 
for Future Research
The results of this study indicated only that performance can 
be maintained at a desired level with feedback being less than the 
most frequent possible. It did not attempt to arrive at the optimum 
or minimum feedback frequency required for a particular level of 
performance. While generalizations applicable to a large number of 
situations may be difficult to make, still more research in this 
direction is necessary before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
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The other area of research which the study has brought out is 
the form of providing feedback. The graphical method of providing 
feedback used in this study seemed quite workable and efficient. It 
has been used before in a number of studies and has even been
preferred by employees and supervisors over some other methods
(Komaki et al., 1982). However, it seems desirable to try out some 
other forms.
In terms of methodological improvements, the need to further 
refine the target behaviors with a view to making them even more 
specific and precise cannot be overstated. Also, while this study 
attempted to cover as many situations, times, and tasks in the
observation sessions as possible, making the sessions more structured 
by way of time and work sampling, duration of tasks, etc. could have 
improved the design even further. Another issue deals with the 
reporting and recording of accidents. It is felt that standardiza­
tion of accident reporting and recording practices with minimal 
situation interpretation will go a long way in making cost-benefit
analyses and comparisons possible and easier.
In addition, the generalizability of the findings of this 
study to different types of work, organizations, environments, and to 
other behaviors remains a matter of concern and needs to be pursued.
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Demographic Information
Shop
Number of 
Employees
Average
Age
(years)
Average
Tenure
(years)
Average
Education
(years)
Average 
Hourly Wage
Boiler 29 32.19 6.08 11.24 $10.52
Machine 15 30.20 5.93 12.00 $10.28
Weld 14 31.48 5.49 11.14 $10.52
APPENDIX III
Key Behaviors for Observation
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KEY BEHAVIORS FOR OBSERVATION
BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
A. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
I. EYES
1. Appropriate, approved eye protection should be worn 
in any area where hazards such as flying objects and 
particles may exist. For example while performing 
or while within 6 feet of someone performing the 
following operations: grinding, hammering, chipping, 
punching, drilling, machining, scaling, buffing, 
gauging, arc welding, oxygen/acetylene brazing or 
cutting.
2. Dark lens cutting goggles should be worn while 
performing any oxygen/acetylene operations like 
burning, cutting, or heating, etc.
3. A welding helmet/shield with filter lens of proper 
shade number should be used whenever performing 
any arc welding operations.
4. Approved safety glasses, with side shields, shall 
be worn at all times in the shop.
II. FACE
1. A welding helmet/shield should be used while 
performing any arc welding operations.
2. Proper face protection equipment (e.g. face 
shield, etc.) should be used whenever involved 
in heavy grinding, buffing, cutting, etc. For 
example, whenever there is danger/possibility of 
sparks flying toward yourself or when in any area 
where hazards which might damage the eyes, face 
or neck are present.
III. HANDS/ARMS
1. Gloves should be worn while engaging in operations 
hazardous to the hands like handling raw material 
or any type of material which has rough or sharp 
edges.
BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
2. Flame proof, leather type gloves should be worn 
when performing welding (arc or oxygen/acetylene).
3. Long-sleeve shirts should be worn when performing 
welding, cutting, or burning operations. Sleeves 
and collars should be buttoned.
IV. EARS
1. Approved hearing protection such as ear muffs or 
ear plugs which meet OSHA specification, shall be 
work at all times in the shop.
V. CLOTHING
1. Clothing which is appropriate and suitable for 
job and work environment should be worn. Loose, 
torn, excessively baggy clothing should not be 
worn.
VI. OTHERS
GENERAL SAFETY
I. POSITION OF SELF
1. Whenever using any tool like hammer, wrench, pinch 
bar, etc.; position yourself such that if the tool 
slips, you will not fall or otherwise be injured.
II. POSITION OF OTHERS
1. Before operating equipment or machinery, check for 
the safety of other personnel by looking for others 
or sounding an audible warning. For example, when 
buffing, grinding, welding, cutting, or chipping, 
be sure that no one is in the path of showering 
particles or sparks. Use proper shielding equip­
ment or warn those in the vicinity (with 6 feet 
radius).
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BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
III. SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURE
1. Make sure all safety equipment is in place before 
operating machinery or other equipment. For 
example, guards, railings, etc. must be in place 
and properly secured.
2. Always perform the job in a safe and proper way.
Do no attempt short cuts for saving time.
IV. USE OF TOOLS
1. Use a tool for its designed purpose only. For 
example, do not use a wrench or crane hook as a 
hammer.
2. Use tools within their maximum capability. Never 
use add-on devices to try to extend tool limits. 
For example, avoid attaching a cheater pipe to a 
wrench, use a larger wrench instead.
3. Inspect and make sure a tool or equipment is not 
defective before using it. Never use defective 
tools or equipment. Return these for repairs or 
discarding.
k. Disconnect portable power tools from their attach­
ment plug as soon as they are not in use.
V. OTHERS
1. Horseplay: Horseplay such as running, shouting,
fighting, goosing, playing, throwing, or any other 
inappropriate behavior in which individuals 
knowingly distract others from their work; is pro­
hibited on company premises. Always walk (except 
in an emergency), especially at or near breaks, 
lunch time, and quitting time.
2. Always be alert for unsafe conditions and correct 
them wherever possible.
BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
C. MATERIAL HANDLING 
I. HANDS/FINGERS
1. Keep your hands and fingers out/away from places 
such as pinch points and other places where 
injuries could occur. For example, grasp chains 
above the load when holding slack before hoisting 
or place palms away from between the load and the 
chain so it won't get caught in between when the 
lift is made.
2. Use a piece of wood or a brush to remove chips or 
objects from machinery— never use fingers. Also, 
always use shavings hooks and brushes to remove 
shavings; never use bare hands.
II. LIFTING
1. When lifting any object by hand, bend your 
knees, keep your back straight/nearly vertical, 
grasp the object firmly, and raise by straightening 
your legs. (Left with your legs and not with your 
back).
2. Always get help from some one or use a crane or 
hoist when handling loads which are too heavy 
for one person. Do not overstretch yourself.
III. HANDHOLD/FOOTHOLD
1. Always maintain a good handhold and footing when 
handling material by hand.
IV. OTHERS
1. Walk or step with caution when walking or stepping 
over material.
2. When piling material, build a solid, sturdy pile. 
Make sure there is a firm foundation and avoid 
piling the material so high that the pile becomes 
unsteady. In piling round bars, pipes, or other 
material that may roll, use sufficient choke at 
the base of the material.
BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
. HOUSEKEEPING
(For observational purposes, employees should be scored for 
the housekeeping of the area within a 5 feet radius of their 
observed position.)
I. WORK AREA
1. Keep floor around machinery clean, dry, and free 
from tripping hazards like material not being used, 
pieces of trash, etc.
II. AISLES/PASSAGEWAYS
1. Keep all aisles, passageways, and stairways clear 
and free from tripping hazards. Tools, materials, 
equipment (except that actually in use) and all 
debris such as welding rod tips, bolts, nuts, and 
other similar material should not be left in the 
aisles, passageways, stairways, etc. where they can 
cause tripping, slipping, or other hazards.
2. Hoses, cables, cords, and other electric con­
ductors should be elevated over or placed under 
the walkway or working surfaces or covered by 
adequate crossover planks or housing— in order 
to prevent people from tripping over them.
III. SPILLS
1. If oil, grease, or other slippery substances are
spilled, wipe them up using rags or floor-dri so that 
no one slips and falls.
IV. OTHERS
1. Avoid piling or storing material or equipment on 
or near the following: a) exits or passageways,
b) crane ladders, c) fire fighting equipment, d) 
electric substations, panels, or equipment dis­
connecting devices (emergency shut offs).
BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTION
• miscellaneous
I. SKIPPING STEPS/JUMPING
1. When ascending or descending a ladder, scaffold 
or in any other climbing situation, use every 
step and be cautious. Avoid hurriedly skipping 
steps and do not jump off.
II. VENTILATION/RESPIRATION
1. Use approved, suitable respirators or ventilators 
when welding or burning in confined spaces and/or 
when welding or burning on materials which give 
off irritating fumes or smoke.
III. OTHERS
APPENDIX IV 
Safety Check list
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SAFETY CHECK LIST
DATE TIME AM/PM
SHOP OBSERVER
ACTIVITY
A. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
 Eyes
 Face
  Hands/Arms
- Ears
  Clothing
  Other (Specify below)
B. GENERAL SAFETY
  Position of self
  Position of others
  Safety equipment/procedure
  Use of tools
  Others (specify below)
C. MATERIAL HANDLING
  Hands/Fingers
  Lifting
  Handhold/Foothold
  Others (Specify below)
D. HOUSEKEEPING
  Work Area
  Aisles/Passageways
  Spills
  Others (Specify below)
E. MISCELLANEOUS
  Skipping Steps/Jumping
  Ventilation/Respiration
  Others (Specify below)
F. COMMENTS (in any)
APPENDIX V 
Description of Slides
Note: Slides marked were used in the Safety Quiz.
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Slide
Number Safe/Unsafe
1. Unsafe
2. Unsafe
>3. Safe
Description
Grinding without face 
shield, gloves, and 
screen.
Grinding with face 
shield but still without 
gloves and screen.
Grinding with face 
shield, gloves, and 
proper screen.
Key
Behavior
Reference
A II 2 
A III 1 
B II 1
A II 1 
B II 1
*4. Unsafe Cutting metal with oxy- A 
acetylene torch, not A 
wearing gloves and dark 
goggles.
I 2 
III 1
5. Safe Cutting metal with oxy- 
acetylene torch, wearing 
gloves and dark goggles.
*6. Unsafe Grinding tool on bench A 
grinder, not wearing face A 
shield and gloves.
II 2
III 1
7. Safe Grinding tool on bench grinder, 
wearing face shield and gloves.
8. Unsafe Welding with half-sleeve A III 3
shirt.
9. Safe Welding with full-sleeve
shirt
10. Unsafe Watching welding arc without A l l
wearing dark goggles.
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Slide
Number Safe/Unsafe Description
Key
Behavior
Reference
11. Unsafe Hammering with another person 
in a position of getting hurt 
if the hammer slips.
B I 1 
B II 1
12. Safe Hammering with the other person 
out of the swing of the hammer—  
will not get hit and hurt even if 
the hammer slips.
13. Unsafe Using wrench for hammering 
(using a tool not for its 
designed purpose).
B IV 1
*14. Safe Doing above job using a hammer 
— the appropriate tool.
15. Unsafe Standing inside the safety 
guard/railing for easier 
access to job on machine—  
improper safety equipment/ 
procedure.
B III 1 
B III 2
16. Safe Doing above job from outside 
the safety guard/railing.
17. Unsafe Using cheater pipe to 
increase capacity of wrench.
B IV 2
18. Safe Doing above job using a larger 
wrench of appropriate size.
>19, Unsafe Standing on crate and drum B I 1
to gain height for work—  C III
liable to fall.
20. Safe Standing on firm footing on 
ground for above job.
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Slide
Number Safe/Unsafe Description
Key
Behavior
Reference
21. Unsafe Using improper grounding 
while welding.
B III 2
22. Safe Using proper grounding 
while welding.
23. Unsafe Raising welding helmet 
while chipping slag off 
after welding.
A II 2 
B III 2
24. Unsafe Letting crane operating 
handle go causing it to 
swing across aisle.
B II 1 
B III 2 
B V 1
25. Unsafe Using flange instead of 
regular balance weight 
to balance drill.
B III 2 
B IV 1
26. Unsafe Lifting incorrectly, using 
back.
C II 1
*27. Safe Lifting correctly, using legs.
*28. Unsafe Putting fingers where they 
get squeezed and hurt while 
lifting with crane.
C I 1
29. Safe Doing above operation safely, 
keeping fingers away from pinch 
points.
30. Unsafe Removing shavings from 
machine by hand.
C I 2
31. Safe Removing shavings from 
machine using hook.
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Slide
Number Safe/Unsafe Description
Key
Behavior
Reference
32. Unsafe Holding job by hand and 
standing too close to it 
while lifting with crane. 
Also lifting job in an un­
balanced way— at an angle.
C I 1 
B V 2
*33. Safe Holding job by guiding rope, 
standing at a safe distance, 
and lifting in a balanced way.
34. Unsafe Lifting heavy job by crane 
without guide rope.
C I 1 
B V 2
35. Safe Using guide rope for heavy 
job.
36. Unsafe Leaving pipe without choke 
at base.
C IV 2
37. Safe Leaving pipe with proper 
choke at base.
38. Unsafe Transporting gas cylinder 
without cap and without 
proper holding chain.
B V 2
39. Safe Transporting gas cylinder 
with its cap on and with 
proper holding chain.
40. Unsafe Working in cluttered up 
work area in boiler shop.
D l l
41. Safe Working in clean work area 
in boiler shop.
42. Unsafe Working with drain cover 
open.
D I 1
43. Safe Working with drain cover 
closed.
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Slide
Number Safe/Unsafe Description
Key
Behavior
Reference
44. Unsafe Working in cluttered up 
area in machine shop.
D l l
45. Safe Working in clean work area 
in machine shop.
46. Unsafe Working in cluttered up work 
area in weld shop.
D l l
47. Safe Working in clean work area 
in weld shop.
OO Unsafe Poor housekeeping, unsafe 
position of self.
D l l
49. Safe Proper housekeeping and 
safe position of self.
50. Unsafe Walking in aisle with cables, 
hoses, etc. lying across the 
aisle.
D II 1
51. Safe Walking in clean aisle, 
free of cables, hoses, etc.
APPENDIX VI 
Safe Behavior Goal Sign 
(Reduced to 42.25% of actual size)
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APPENDIX VII 
Feedback Sign 
(Reduced to 42.25% of actual size)
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Safety Goal Questionnaire
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ARIMA Results
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ARIMA Autocorrelation Check of Residuals
Phase Q-Statistic d.f. Prob.
A 6.42 5 0.267
B 4.78 5 0.444
BCX 8.18 4 0.085
BC2 7.62 5 0.179
RevB 5.14 5 0.398
RevBC2 5.77 4 0.217
APPENDIX X
ANOVA Results
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE PROCEDURE 
CLASS LEVEL INFORMATION
CLASS LEVELS VALUES
PHASE 6 1BASLIN 2TRG&GS 3TGSFB1 4TGSFB2 5RETRGS 6REVFB2
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN DATA SET = 323
NOTE: ALL DEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE CONSISTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF MISSING VALUES, 
HOWEVER, ONLY 321 OBSERVATIONS IN DATA SET CAN BE USED IN THIS ANALYSIS.
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE PROCEDURE
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: OBS FORECAST FOR OBS
SOURCE DF SUM of SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F VALUE PR > F R-SQUARE C.V.
MODEL 5 34520.41822080 6904.08364416 301.37 0.0001 0.827097 5.4468
ERROR 315 7216.41271356 22.90924671 ROOT MSE OBS MEAN
CORRECTED TOTAL 320 41736.83093435 4.78636049 87.87460591
SOURCE DF ANOVA SS F VALUE PR > F
PHASE 5 34520.41822080 301.37 0.0001
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